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Abstract 
 
Purpose –The financial restructuring of the US department store industry is commonly 
interpreted as a time of corporate excess, value-destruction and ultimately collapse.  This 
research aims to re-analyse these events using qualitative methods to understand the 
background to the leveraged transactions and to review the implications that their failure had 
for the longer term strategy and structure of the US department store industry. 
Design/methodology/approach – The research is based on two extensive periods of fieldwork 
in the United States when the author interviewed (n=28) many of the protagonists of the 1980s 
restructuring period and those who inherited the management of the bankrupt businesses in the 
1990s.  By adopting a qualitative perspective, we are accessing social and human perspectives 
of these developments as well as their wider effects. 
Findings – The leveraged transactions were conceptually an appropriate attempt to centralise 
the structure of the industry but their execution was not possible under such extreme financial 
distress.  However, bankruptcy protection provided the environmental conditions to realise the 
benefits of more efficient strategic and subsequent wide-ranging structural change. 
Originality/value – This research differs from economistic readings of the period that analyse 
changes in market value of the constituent firms and the more reactionary journalistic 
accounts.  The paper re-casts the failed financial restructuring in a new light, underlining the 
regenerative effects of Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Protection in promoting firm revival, alongside 
visionary leadership. 
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INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES 
Alfred Chandler’s classic historical 1962 study ‘Strategy and Structure’ examined the crucial 
link between a company’s strategy and its internal structure.  For Chandler, the multi-
divisional structure that emerged in the early 20th Century had proved successful because ‘it 
clearly removed the executives responsible for the destiny of the entire enterprise from the 
more routine operational activities, and so gave them time, information, and even 
psychological commitment for long-term planning and appraisal’ (Chandler, 1966, p 382).  
This view played an influential role in the decentralisation of many leading corporations in the 
1960s and 1970s (Rodrigues, 2002).  However, from the 1980s onwards, there ‘was growing 
scepticism about the role of diversified multi-divisional firms’ (Toms and Wright, 2005, p 
275).  This scepticism solidified into major deconglomeration as the decade progressed with an 
increase in highly leveraged transactions across American industry as acquirers restructured, 
extracted surplus value and improved firm performance (Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001). 
 
While many of these transactions were successful, increased shareholder value and the 
operating effectiveness of the corporations (Cotter and Peck, 2001; Jensen, 1993), one sector 
in particular - the US department store industry - was seemingly left devastated by a number of 
high profile bankruptcies.  Casualties, amongst numerous others, included the Allied/Federated 
conglomerate, which was acquired and consolidated by the Campeau Corporation, and the 
world renowned, RH Macy, both of which entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in 1990 
and 1992 respectively (see Table 1).  These “failures” become notorious and ‘came to 
symbolize the folly of leverage in an overheated market for corporate assets’ (Baker and 
Smith, 1998, p 124). 
 
This paper revisits these attempts to recast the structure of the US department store sector and 
focuses on understanding the longer term implications of events from the executives who 
experienced them and were left with the task of reworking the strategies and structure of the 
constituent firms.  There are two aims of this research.  Firstly, this paper seeks to understand 
the background to the leveraged transactions, the motivations for them, and the wider 
environmental circumstances in which they occurred.  Secondly, and more substantively, we 
aim to analyse the implications that the transactions had for the strategy and structure of the 
US department store industry.  In particular, the paper seeks to uncover the contradiction that 
while leverage was conceptually appropriate in terms of extracting improved efficiency within 
the acquired retailers, it ended up actually constraining synergy realisation and led to 
bankruptcy.  However, the very efficiency-generating and structural centralisation argument 
that was the driving force behind justifying leverage was only realised during the post-
bankruptcy period as Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Protection insulated the operators as they 
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emerged from restructuring and instigated the necessary strategic and structural adaptation to 
the new retail environment. 
 
This paper is unique because it extends beyond purely financial analyses of the transactions in 
terms of changes in market value (e.g. Kaplan, 1989; 1994) or the journalistic accounts (e.g. 
Rothchild, 1991; Tranchtenberg, 1996).  It is based on corporate interviews with a wide array 
of US industry executives and analysts, both past and present1, that are triangulated with a 
wide range of secondary material including press and analyst reports.  The advantage of 
analysing the 1980s is that there is scope to interview the primary actors and analysts involved 
before, during, and after the buy-outs, accessing social and human perspectives and thereby 
avoiding a key concern of one historian who suggested that ‘much of what we know about the 
history of American retailing comes from secondary sources, all too often accepted as part of 
the discipline without adequate confirmation’ (Savitt, 1989, p 350).  An obvious contribution 
of such retail history lies in reflecting experience and understanding on the contemporary 
industry - using the past ‘to help inform the present and the future’ (Lamond, 2006, p 9). 
 
The paper first briefly analyses the strategy and structure of the US department store sector in 
the 1980s and the mismatch between the two given the increasingly competitive retail 
environment of the period.  Second, in the light of these structural challenges we analyse the 
theoretical basis for the leveraged buy-outs of these operators.  The third and fourth sections 
introduce two case studies that were central to the restructuring of the sector: Federated/Allied 
and RH Macy’s.  These are developed in the fifth section of the paper by examining an array 
of data collected in our semi-structured interviews with the executives and analysts involved in 
the sector, before forming some brief conclusions. 
 
                                                 
1
 This paper is based on an extensive period of fieldwork in the US during 2000 and 2001 when the 
author interviewed a wide array of industry executives and analysts, both past and present (n = 28).  
These included: Jim Zimmerman and Allen Questrom, both former CEO’s of Federated Department 
Stores; Terry Lundgren, current CEO of Federated; Phil Miller, then Chairman of Saks Fifth Avenue; 
Hal Khan, then Chairman of Macy’s East; Don Eugine, former CFO Macy’s; Michael Gould, President 
of Bloomingdale’s; Peter Sachse, Chief Marketing Officer, Macy’s; Carol Sanger, former Vice President 
of Federated Department Stores; Harry Frenkel, Senior Vice President & Chief Financial Officer, 
Federated Merchandising Group; and Daniel Barry, Managing Director of Merrill Lynch, New York.  
The material was coded and analysed in accordance with conventional qualitative research practice. 
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THE STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE OF THE US DEPARTMENT STORE SECTOR 
IN THE 1980s 
 
Inefficient structures, diversification and the need for efficiency 
Chandler’s work (1966; 1977) charted the profitable decentralization of major US corporations 
between 1850 and 1920 ‘through greater diversification or at least divisionalization’ (Acar et 
al., 2003, p 1228).  For Chandler the business environment affected strategy, which in turn 
developed structure, and ultimately led to economic efficiency.  While the interplay between 
strategy and structure remains less linear than Chandler suggested – reality ‘is a mess in which 
strategy and structure mix madly’ (Rodrigues, 2002, p20) – it is clear that the firm has to create 
a strategic fit with its requisite environment (Porter, 1985). 
 
By the start of the 1980s the US department store industry possessed a structure that was 
highly inefficient.  The sector had not adapted to an environment where its discount and 
speciality store competitors were increasingly centralised, lean and technologically advanced, 
which permitted rapid responses to industry demands and saw them increasing their market 
shares of GAF (general merchandise, apparel and furniture sales) at the expense of department 
stores (McNair and May, 1978). 
 
Although appearing to consist of a relatively centralised industry following the mergers of 
formerly independent department stores to form holding companies in the 1920s, the major 
operators such as Allied Stores, Carter Hawley Hale, RH Macy and Federated possessed 
highly decentralised organisational structures.  Each fascia or division remained remarkably 
independent in operation, neglecting the potential realisation of economies of scale through 
pooled buying for example (Raff, 1991).  As Paul Nystrom argued at the time of the 1920s 
consolidations, ‘merely changing the ownership without changing the service, merely results in 
deflecting retail net profits, such as they are, from private owners to co-operative owners’ 
(Clark et al., 1926, p 257).  This meant that consolidations ‘have unified ownership, but, for 
the most part, these seem to have gone but a small way toward achieving the advantages of 
group management’ (Griffen et al., 1928, p 27). 
 
By the 1950s this inefficient structure was noted with concern as ‘Each store still maintains its 
individual departmental buyers.  Hence if we were to use language strictly, the common 
application of the term “chain” to such organizations is a misnomer’ (McNair, 1950, p 136).  
Contrasted with the chained department stores such as Sears and JC Penney that had 
successfully adopted a more centralised, chained structure (Tedlow, 1996), McNair noted that 
with ‘department store holding groups like Federated, Allied, and so on, we find that the total 
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expense rates of ownership groups is some 20% of sales higher than that of true chains’ 
(McNair, 1950, p 136). 
 
The department store sector’s inefficiency was exacerbated by its participation in the wider 
conglomerate wave in Anglo-American industry in the 1960s and 1970s (cf. Goold and Luchs, 
1993; Toms and Wright, 2005).  Instead of concentrating on its core business, department store 
firms pursued growth in other retailing sectors that lacked commonality and synergy with its 
core business (Laulajainen, 1987 - see Table 2).  This diversification was often ill-judged and 
generated poor returns.  Allen Questrom, former CEO of JC Penney, Barneys and Federated 
Department Store, reflected:  
 
…in some cases the management of Federated felt that the department store was a 
problem and that they would focus on other strategies – speciality stores … 
supermarkets [and] discount stores…  They were never really that successful.  And 
meanwhile they weren’t putting the attention on the department store concept (Allen 
Questrom, Personal Interview). 
 
As economist Michael Jensen has repeatedly argued, by the 1980s such conglomeration 
initiatives were proving to be an inefficient way to deploy capital and failed to produce 
adequate shareholder returns (Jensen et al., 2006, p 17-18). 
 
Agency theory and the potential for leverage 
In Chandler’s terms, there was a mismatch between the strategy, structure and the operating 
environment within the department store companies.  As core department store growth slowed 
the sector’s inefficiencies became more pronounced.  Hal Kahn, former Chairman of Macy’s 
East reflected: 
 
…in the 1980s, for the first time, department stores started to experience single digit 
growth and malls were not being opened as aggressively as they once 
were…Department stores had to come to grips with how you run a business with 
single digit growth because before that, the volume would absorb all the 
expenses…[they] had to become much more financially [astute] (Hal Kahn, Personal 
Interview). 
 
This period coincided with concerns by financial economists, most notably Michael Jensen, 
who sought to explain the mismatch between conglomerate management’s strategy and the 
interests of its shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  He argued that when ownership is 
separated from control in a large corporation, the agent or manager who acts on behalf of the 
owner may not always pursue investments and strategies that are to the advantage of that 
owner (see Jensen, 2005 for a summary).  The solution was to align the interests of owners 
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(shareholders) and management with the re-emergence of active investors that were recognised 
as ‘individuals or institutions that simultaneously hold large debt and/or equity positions in a 
company and actively participate in its strategic direction’ (Jensen, 1993, p 867).  This was 
executed via a number of highly leveraged transactions (principally leveraged buy-outs 
[LBOs] and leveraged recapitalisations), and more generally, an astounding number of mergers 
and acquisitions throughout the US economy (see Figure 1).  Many of the highly leveraged 
transactions were realised through the evolution of a new type of financial instrument - so-
called ‘junk’ bonds.  These were high yield, noninvestment-grade securities, pioneered by the 
investment bank Drexel Burnham Lambert, reflecting greater risk as the credit rating was 
classified as below investment grade (Frick, 2001).  In definitional terms, a leveraged buy-out 
occurs when third party investors and/or managers of a firm offer to pay a premium over the 
prevailing market price of the firm and finance the exchange of corporate control by taking on 
a significant amount of debt (Jensen 1989).  Such strategies rested on the premise that 
pressures created by the need to service high debt levels would concentrate management on 
cash flow and efficiency rather than unproductive investment (Peck, 2004; Wright et al., 
2005).  These buy-outs were conceived by third party organisations such as Kohlberg Kravis 
Roberts (KKR) that would capitalise on the increased value generated from the efficiency 
gains after a number of years of ownership where they took on an essential governance role on 
the board which is a key component of ensuring value creation (Baker and Smith, 1998; Braun 
and Latham, 2007; Nikoskelainen and Wright, 2007). 
 
The department store companies appeared excellent targets for such acquisition due to their 
outdated strategy and structure that could yield value through reorganisation.  In this decade of 
low department store sales growth, the stock market placed a low valuation on these 
historically trusted companies that provided reliable, if rarely surprising, returns for investors.  
Such low valuations allowed potential predators to unlock the often considerable real estate 
values inherent within the conglomerates’ store portfolios at relatively low prices.  
Furthermore, numerous LBOs were proving successful in other retail sectors.  For example, in 
the food market, the Safeway leveraged buy-out by the specialist LBO firm KKR in 1986 for 
$4.3 billion (Denis, 1994).  In addition, Kroger, the second largest US grocer, undertook a 
successful $4.1 billion leveraged recapitalisation in 1988.   
 
The following two case studies, briefly presented and subsequently analysed in depth, are the 
two most notable of the period: the Campeau Corporation’s acquisition of Federated and 
Allied and the highly leveraged transaction of RH Macy. 
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CASE STUDY CONTEXT: FEDERATED, ALLIED AND THE CAMPEAU 
CORPORATION 
During the 1980s, Federated and Allied, two of the largest and most high-profile department 
store holding companies in the United States, were central to the financial re-engineering of 
the retail sector.  The saga centred on Canadian real estate developer Robert Campeau who 
used relatively little of his own capital as proportions of the purchase prices.  First, Campeau 
purchased Allied Stores Corporation in October 1986 for $3.6 billion, plus assumed debt and 
fees - $4.4 billion in all.  As this was at the height of the junk boom, it was financed almost 
exclusively through Citibank and First Boston, with Campeau only providing $150 million 
himself (Rothchild, 1991). 
 
In common with other leveraged transactions, there was immediate divestiture as the firm, 
constrained by its crippling debt burdens, had to dispose of its most unproductive assets or 
divisions not central to its core business operations (cf. Wright et al., 2005).  In this manner 
Allied, sold 16 of its smaller units for $1.16 billion in 1987 but still held prestigious divisions 
such as Brooks Brothers which was widely regarded the jewel in Allied’s crown (Hallsworth, 
1991). 
 
Difficulties emerged when Campeau turned his attention to acquiring Federated Department 
Stores, which offered the potential for synergistic benefits as he would be able to open new 
malls and, as the owner of the key anchor department stores, pick and choose his mall designs 
to exclude stores he did not own (Hallsworth, 1991).  However, a year and a half after the 
acquisition of Allied, Campeau was still reorganising the new firm into a stable enterprise 
when a bidding war commenced with RH Macy for control of Federated.  This was eventually 
won by Campeau at $73.50 a share compared to the earlier price of $33.  The overall purchase 
price has been calculated at $8.17bn, representing a bid premium of $3.3bn, financed by 97% 
debt (Kaplan, 1989).  There is little wonder that Fortune magazine called it ‘the biggest, 
looniest deal ever’ (Loomis, 1990). 
 
Market confidence was crucial to both transactions in keeping the Campeau Corporation 
liquid, in particular, the retention of Brooks Brothers in the Allied portfolio gave the 
company’s backers confidence.  However, the divestiture of Brooks to finance the Federated 
deal led Allied backers to conclude that their assets were being sold off to fund the Federated 
shareholders, who had seen their company double in value over four months.  The rising 
valuation sparked concern over what else would need to be sold to fund the costly acquisition, 
and confidence fell (Rothchild, 1991).  Campeau responded by divesting further chains from 
newly acquired Federated to reduce short-term debt – notably I. Magnin and Bullock’s to 
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Macy for $1.1 billion, and Foley’s and Filene’s were offloaded to May Department Stores for 
$1.5 billion in July 1988 (Kaplan, 1989).  Despite these measures, the price for which 
Federated was purchased was simply too high and the crippling debt burden finally caught up 
with the Campeau Corporation when it filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in January 
1990. 
 
CASE STUDY CONTEXT: THE R H MACY LEVERAGED BUY-OUT 
The RH Macy experience of the late 1980s parallels the ill-fated financial restructuring of the 
Campeau Corporation.  In 1986, the CEO of Macy’s, Edward Finkelstein, led a $3.5 billion 
leveraged buy-out.  Prior to the buy-out, Macy’s had $144 million debt and $1.48 billion in 
shareholder equity (c. $1 of debt to every $11 of equity).  Following the takeover, the firm had 
$290 million in equity, as the ratio became $10 of debt to every $1 in equity (Trachtenberg, 
1996).  Despite this, the transaction was well-received by the financial markets.  The rationale 
of the LBO was underpinned by a number of case-specific factors: 
 
First, there was the opinion that taking the company private through an LBO would offer a safe 
haven from Wall Street’s earnings expectations.  As the Director of Stores for Macy’s East 
reflected, the view of the firm was that it would no longer ‘be subject to the quarterly whims of 
the stock market’ (Peter Sachse, Personal Interview).  Theoretically, the low valuation of the 
department store stocks provided the opportunity for the LBO to realise the ‘real’ value of the 
firm, if privately owned. 
 
Second, the Macy LBO was motivated in part by a hostile takeover threat from elsewhere in 
the retail industry.  A number of precedents had been set by the mid-1980s.  In the late 1970s, 
West Coast department store operator, Carter Hawley Hale aggressively pursued Marshall 
Field, the Chicago-based luxury department store, for a potential hostile takeover.  Field 
responded by leveraging its capital structure through organic expansion (Laulajainen, 1990).  
Moreover, Carter Hawley Hale itself faced the threat of a hostile takeover in 1984, when 
Columbus-based women’s apparel retailer, The Limited Inc., made a bid at 25-35% above its 
going market price.  The corporation succeeded in fending off the tender, but only by 
disposing of its Weinstocks division and ceding 37% of the voting power to a single 
shareholder, General Cinema Corporation (Laulajainen, 1987).  Furthermore, in 1986, partly 
responding to similar pressures, May Department Stores acquired Associated Dry Goods 
Company operators of Lord & Taylor amongst others for $2.5 billion (Simpson, 2001).  The 
impact of these threats for the department store industry cannot be overemphasised.  As Walter 
Loeb, special advisor for Morgan Stanley, reflected, department stores ‘looked at themselves 
and said size mattered and that they had to get bigger’ (Walter Loeb, Personal Interview).  The 
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alternative, of course, was to LBO and go private because ‘size and performance would no 
longer be enough to guarantee the independence of any company’ (Trachtenberg, 1996, p 28). 
 
Finally, and most importantly, the rationale of the Macy’s LBO was driven by the premise that 
investors in the buy-out stood to extract considerable personal gain as a result.  The prospects 
were good: Macy’s was a national institution and had grown significantly through the 1970s 
and early 1980s under the skilled merchandising leadership of Edward Finkelstein and the 
transaction would retain the current management. 
 
The Chapter 11 filing and the capital structure bankruptcy 
It is clear that Macy’s eventual filing for bankruptcy protection in 1992, like the Campeau 
Corporation’s before it, was fundamentally a capital structure bankruptcy rather than reflecting 
any failure of the department store concept per se.  As Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) reflect 
more generally for the period, the ‘reason for the defaults was not that profits didn’t improve, 
but that they didn’t improve enough to pay off the enormous quantities of debt that had been 
taken on’ (p 128).  It is ironic that the Macy 1986 LBO was partially motivated by the urge to 
avoid the pressures of Wall Street, yet was replaced by the unforgiving form of debt.  A senior 
Macy executive reflected: 
 
… the focus that we thought we would be relieved of – that we could run a business on 
a long term basis and we didn’t have to worry about this month’s results…[was 
incorrect as] actually the opposite happened because we became so focused on comp 
[comparative] store sales which drove cash and paid the debt (Peter Sachse, Personal 
Interview). 
 
The financial distress that followed the LBO was however exacerbated by a number of issues. 
First, the late 1980s/early 1990s was a time of harsh recession for the retail industry causing a 
severe reduction in anticipated free cash flow provision (Walters, 1994).  Second, the Macy’s 
franchise was being run in a more price promotional manner than was suited to its market 
positioning due to the pressure to service debt in the short term.  The final, and most 
fundamental factor, was the over-inflated $2.2 billion which Finkelstein paid for the two 
chains from debt-ridden Federated (I. Magnin’s and Bullock’s).  By the early 1990s, as 
Fortune magazine reflected, ‘Macy’s bonds were marked down like ugly sweaters in a one day 
sale’, and the firm capitulated (Serwer, 1996). 
 
LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING PERIOD 
Understandably the late 1980s financial restructuring for the department store sector has been 
characterised almost exclusively by the use of adjectives such as ‘looniest’ and ‘crazy’ (see for 
example Loomis, 1990), while Business Week classified the Campeau acquisition of Federated 
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as one of the ten worst deals of the 1980s (Business Week, 1990).  It is clear that the corporate 
control mechanism failed as the bidding wars, especially that between Robert Campeau and 
Edward Finkelstein for the ownership of Federated, spiralled out of control and were based on 
ego rather than any relationship to firm value or the ability to pay the capital back.  Both 
retailers were heavily debt burdened and faced considerable challenges in paying down initial 
levels of leverage, regardless of adding to these deficits. 
 
In the following sections, by accessing the views of a wide array of executives and analysts at 
the forefront of these developments through personal interviews, we seek to deepen our 
understanding of the consolidations and their wider implications for the strategy and structure 
of the US department store industry. 
 
A prompt to structural change and the role of Chapter 11 
Our key finding is that although the financial restructuring of the late 1980s was poorly 
executed, the efficiency imperative of strategic and structural change was essential for the 
sector – though the capital was not immediately available to realise it.  It was only during 
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Protection that the impetus and partial debt write-off came together 
and these efficiencies were realised with any conviction.  It is notable how positively the 
management of the time viewed the Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing with a clear sense of relief 
amid Federated, and to a lesser extent at Macy’s.  This was largely due to the nature of US 
bankruptcy legislation that ‘does not require that a debtor be insolvent in order to qualify for 
reorganization, and it includes a strong presumption favoring retention of management 
throughout the reorganisation process’ (Bradley and Rosenzweig, 1992, p 1044). 
 
Chapter 11 protects the firm from its creditors whilst allowing the company to continue 
trading.  The softening of the US bankruptcy protection can be charted back to the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978 (and its subsequent revisions) which had the effect of encouraging ‘pre-
packaged’ bankruptcies (McDowell, 2004).  In this arrangement, the firm is compelled to 
produce a reorganisation plan to present before the court, in which the debt and organisational 
structure can be reworked whilst ‘reasonably satisfying’ creditors rather than a liquidation of 
the company as such (Hotchkiss, 1995).  Indeed, research has found that larger firms such as 
Federated are more likely to prosper following bankruptcy (Dawley et al., 2003). 
 
The impact of Chapter 11 status on Federated is a classic example of the benefits of the 
bankruptcy process for a retailer, which remained there for a little over two years from January 
1990 to February 1992.  As one prominent retail analyst suggested, the bankruptcy process 
was: 
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…made for somebody like a Federated that had excellent properties, and excellent 
franchises….[and] brand names with consumers, especially with Bloomingdale’s and 
Macy’s (Pam Stubing, Personal Interview). 
 
The procedure allowed the firm to cancel leases that it was tied to prior to the filing; selling or 
closing 41 unprofitable locations, and renegotiating debt with creditors (Kaplan, 1994).  This 
led Kaplan to conclude, ‘the post-bankruptcy Federated appears to be a better run than the pre-
distress and pre-Campeau company’ (Kaplan, 1994, p 135).  Perversely then, for some 
financial economists, ‘financial distress, even bankruptcy, did not necessarily mean that a 
highly leveraged investment had failed to create value – far from it’ (Baker and Smith, 1998, p 
125). 
 
Conversely, Macy’s bankruptcy process was a lengthy procedure in which construction of a re-
organisation plan proved problematic.  It languished in Chapter 11 protection from January 
1992 until its acquisition by renewed Federated in December 1994.  Federated undertook this 
transaction through the purchase of a proportion of Macy’s debt, in doing so becoming the 
principal creditor in Chapter 11 proceedings and hence acquiring control (Anson, 2002).  This 
was followed by the acquisition of the post-bankruptcy Broadway Stores (formally Carter 
Hawley Hale) that was once again struggling.  This gave a newly revitalised Federated an 
increased national presence and an organisational structure ripe for substantial reorganisation. 
 
Jim Zimmerman, until recently the CEO of Federated, reflected on the added compulsion 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy brought: 
 
In many ways it was the best thing that ever happened to Federated because the 
amount of change that arguably was needed in the way that the business was being 
run, probably could not have come gradually.  Or would not have come fast enough 
had it come gradually, and the take-over and the trauma that surrounded that, made it 
very clear what the focal point was and changed a whole lot of people… It was an era 
that a lot of the traditionally bad things happened, or things happened that would 
traditionally be called bad, but it was also a period of time that really catalysed the 
corporation and caused and allowed it to make change that made it a viable entity, 
whereas it might not have been without that (Jim Zimmerman, Personal Interview, 
emphasis added). 
 
It is important to note that Zimmerman had no reason to put any positive gloss on the 
experience.  It is widely known across the industry, and in journalistic records of the episode, 
that he was vehemently opposed to what Campeau was doing.  In addition, Allen Questrom, 
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Federated’s CEO from 1990-1997, who had previously left the firm in 1988 in protest at the 
conduct of the Campeau Corporation’s running of the conglomerate, retrospectively suggested 
that  ‘the reorganisation because of the bankruptcy allowed them to do a lot of things that 
[they]… should have done perhaps before’ (Allen Questrom Personal Interview).  Harry 
Frenkel, CFO of Federated Merchandising Group similarly admitted that much of the 
organisational restructuring in centralising merchandising was prompted by the Chapter 11 
procedure: as ‘it would have happened naturally I think just because of competitive forces, but 
I think this pushed us quickly’ (Harry Frenkel, Personal Interview).  Another corporate 
executive revealed the sense of empowerment felt by Federated’s senior management at the 
removal of the parent Campeau conglomerate on Chapter 11 filing suggesting: 
 
It was wonderful.  It was a good thing for us.  It is the opposite of what you would think.  
You would think that when you file bankruptcy that everything is gloom and doom but for 
us it was like we were casting off a yoke of this [man]… that had come in here and 
saddled the company with all of this huge debt that no matter how successful the stores 
were, and they continued to be successful through all of this, it didn’t matter – you 
couldn’t pay off that amount of debt.  When we filed Chapter 11 it was regaining control 
of our own destiny (Carol Sanger, Personal Interview). 
 
The financial distress of debt and then the spur of bankruptcy was the catalyst to vital 
organisational restructuring and to the divisional centralisation across the industry.  Table 3 
compares the industry structure between 1985 and 1995.  The degree of divisional 
centralisation is notable – a trend that was especially evident at Federated Department Stores 
where the pace of restructuring to focus on core brands was ramped up following its 
emergence from bankruptcy (see Table 4). 
 
Bankruptcy, and restructuring following Chapter 11 Protection, allowed the key players to 
establish themselves and, by the start of the 1990s, ‘forced a re-evaluation of dire predictions 
about the fate of the department store industry’ (Forsyth, 1993, p 29).  As a result, the decade 
was a period of organisational restructuring and divisional centralisation in these large players 
with the provision of shared administrative services, the concentration of buying and 
merchandising and the consolidation of formally autonomous divisions.  By the mid 1990s 
Federated had developed a centralised merchandising group that ‘scouts the market and 
determines what…[individual divisions] … should look at.…and makes some decisions based 
on economies of scale….but allow the divisions, where the customers see it, to have their own 
identity’ (Carol Sanger, Personal Interview).  Similarly Terry Lundgren, current CEO of 
Federated, explained the rationale for the developments: 
 
Every division used to have their own separate organisation – we don’t need that 
anymore….All of our technology, all of our systems, computer operations – every 
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division used to have their own set up for that.  Now there is one state of the art 
organisation outside of Atlanta that services all of the systems needs for our stores.  
One credit facility in Ohio services all of them (Terry Lundgren, Personal Interview). 
 
The ultimate impact of Chapter 11 was facilitating a change in industry structure and thus 
these newly reinvigorated department stores started to operate in an integrated, technologically 
inter-linked manner, resembling the discount and speciality stores that were stealing so much 
of their market share (Wood, 2002).  Gradually, a centralised model of organisation has 
emerged, albeit with sensitivity to local markets; so as ‘to enable the store management to 
maintain links to the buyers and strategists in head office as well as to the customers but within 
the structure of a very large firm’ (Dawson, 2000, p 125). 
 
Cash flow and executing organisational centralisation under debt constraints 
Our findings also suggest that conceptually the structural centralisation that accompanied 
leverage was appropriate; it was the degree of leverage of the department store companies that 
was poorly judged.  Further exacerbating this issue is that luxury retailers are characterised by 
highly cyclical cash flows (and disproportionately affected by economic downturns) so 
unsuited to very high leverage.  Allen Questrom, former Federated CEO, noted that many of 
the organisational restructuring strategies attempted by Campeau in the Allied/Federated 
acquisitions were appropriate but the lack of funding due to servicing debt burdens constrained 
their realisation: 
 
Bob’s strategy was a right strategy.  He was going to consolidate the businesses of 
Federated and Allied, take advantage of consolidating the businesses of Federated – 
the corporate offices and divisions – try to get some commonality between the 
stores and make cost savings.  And then he was going to use those savings to 
obviously pay the debt.  His proforma to buy was conceptually right [but] was 
tactically was all wrong.  He had to [have] higher sales increases, higher margin 
increases and bigger expense savings to make this thing all work (Allen Questrom, 
Personal Interview). 
 
The efficiencies that the Campeau Corporation was seeking were set against the lack of room 
for manoeuvre set by the debt burden which could not tolerate negative synergies in the short 
term.  The critical period following the leveraged acquisition was further impacted by an 
economic downturn.  As Goldman Sachs retail analyst, George Strachan explained: 
 
My read on it is that this is still a relatively cyclical business and it is very 
dangerous to over-leverage the company because as soon as you go into a cyclical 
downturn, any operating issues that you may have are aggregated 10 fold and 
suddenly you find yourself illiquid, especially if you take on all this high yield debt 
(George Strachan, Personal Interview).   
 
 14  
Instead, successful leveraged transactions ‘tend to be heavily concentrated in industries with 
relatively stable demand and relatively static technology’ (Thompson and Wright 1995, p 699).  
While the amortisation schedules of the loans can be structured to accommodate cyclical 
flows, an ‘industry prone to cyclical demand cycles, hence irregular cash flows and 
unpredictable working capital requirements, or whose fate is linked to that of a few suppliers 
or buyers, may not be a fit candidate for aggressive leveraging’ (Sharma, 2004, p 40).  As 
such, the LBO financiers were arguably too focused on finance monitoring rather than 
possessing a deep understanding of department store retailing with remuneration focused on 
deal construction rather than on the basis of medium/long term success (cf. Baker et al., 1998).   
 
Further complicating the execution of efficiency-seeking structural is that such organisational 
restructuring requires some facilitating investment that cannot be achieved under such 
crippling leverage.  As recent research has noted, ‘an important aspect of realizing synergy 
may be to invest in additional resources and maintain slack’ (Gary, 2005, p 660) – exactly 
what was not possible in the Macy and Federated buy-outs. 
 
Investment in networked computer systems to facilitate data processing and sales interpretation 
with divisional consolidation was not viable during such financial distress.  As a former Macy 
East Chairman acknowledged: 
 
When we were cash strapped, our biggest challenge from our customers was that you 
were never in stock so we went from a 12% stock-out at bankruptcy to about a 3%.  
We just didn’t have the systems…we didn’t have the technology…giving buyers 
computers?  We didn’t have the money to do all those things so we weren’t investing 
in the new technology (Hal Kahn, Personal Interview). 
 
Even when divisional consolidation did occur, department stores were often unable to fully 
utilise synergistic benefits.  The merger of Macy’s New Jersey and New York divisions was 
only partially successful, with one division owning IBM cash registers, and the other NCR 
registers.  This prevented the integration and interpretation of sales and inventory information, 
with little finance to invest in communal technology.  Indeed, while the financial distress of 
high corporate debt does reduce investment in ill-judged projects, ‘it is not clear whether 
investment cuts eliminate poor projects or value-enhancing investments’ (Servaes, 1994, p 
254). 
 
Resistance, knowledge and leadership in the organisation 
Another key issue that prevented successful restructuring of the retailers during the periods of 
financial distress was internal resistance to change.  Contemporary management literature has 
 15  
underlined the role of individuals in driving and executing corporate strategy, while also 
emphasising how employees may possess different value asymmetries to that of the firm (e.g. 
Schoenberger, 1997).  There is considerable evidence that such perspectives were overlooked 
as the Campeau takeovers differed from conventional leveraged buy-outs by not offering 
management an equity stake (Kaplan, 1989; cf. Jensen, 1989).  As one former-President of 
Allied Stores’ International Division testified, there was considerable resistance within the 
firms to the divisional consolidation and organisational centralisation brought about by 
financial restructuring – there were endemic values of independence: 
 
Well, if I’m at Bloomingdale’s, why should I talk to A&S?  Why should I talk to 
Lazurus?  …. There was no reason why Abraham and Strauss, Rike Kumler, Shillitos 
and Lazurus and Rich’s couldn’t talk to each other (Howard Biederman, Personal 
Interview).2 
 
The reluctance to centralise divisions in the Allied/Federated Campeau Corporation, in part, 
contributed to the downfall of the venture, as Allen Questrom confirmed: 
 
He [Campeau] couldn’t get the Federated and Allied organisations to work together.  
In many ways they conspired against him…. I think most of the people in Federated… 
saw him as some kind of a kook.  They were very autonomous already so here was a 
company with a history of being very autonomous and they were not about to let this 
guy run the show (Allen Questrom, Personal Interview). 
 
The experience of the financial restructuring consequently underlines the importance of 
organisational cultural considerations in executing post-acquisition restructuring (Meyer and 
Lieb-Dóczy, 2003). 
 
The questionable quality of leadership during the periods of high leverage was also 
fundamental to failure.  The executives managing the two corporations, Campeau and 
Finkelstein, could not have been more divergent in their expertise.  Campeau was essentially a 
real estate developer who had no background in retailing.  What is more astounding is that 
very few people in the Campeau organisation possessed any such experience and were in fact 
essentially experts in finance and large deal formulation.   
 
This meant that the cash projections developed for the department stores under high leverage 
were overly optimistic and not grounded in department store economics.  As Marvin Traub, 
the ex-President of Bloomingdale’s (a division of Federated), acknowledged: 
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I realised that all of the Campeau projections… had been totally done within First 
Boston and the Campeau Organization….No banker ever…came to Bloomingdale’s to 
ask if I thought we could deliver those numbers (Traub, 1994, p 293). 
 
Conversely, Macy’s senior management was made up of department store merchants who had 
an intricate knowledge of the department store business in terms of effective merchandising, 
but lacked expertise in generating efficiencies in operation to increase cash flow and alleviate 
financial distress.  After all, the department store industry had become a target for high 
leveraging because it was inefficiently run, yet in the Macy case the same executives took 
control.  It was inconceivable that they could generate a new organisational structure without 
minimal previous experience of doing so.  As the former Chairman of Macy’s East reflected: 
 
Macy’s management, which I was part of then, never knew how to run the business as 
a financially astute operator as Federated [now] does, so we made all sorts of mistakes 
getting deeper in debt, building up the inventories – it really is really naive looking 
back in terms of how do you approach an LBO (Hal Kahn, Personal Interview). 
 
In contrast, the leadership of the post-bankruptcy Federated/Macy’s organisation was 
outstanding.  As Brockman et al. (2006) note, positive bankruptcy strategic change is highest 
for firms hiring an outsider, giving him duality, retaining a top management team and giving 
him a long tenure (see also Hotchkiss, 1995).  This is exactly what occurred with the 
appointment of Allen Questrom from Neiman Marcus. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has analysed a period in US retailing that is renowned for failure and financial 
collapse.  The wave of financial restructuring in the US department store sector was clearly 
disastrous, even if its imperative of centralised strategic and structural change was appropriate.  
More interestingly though, by using qualitative interviews with many of the leading actors 
involved in the sector at the time and since, we have been able to build up an understanding of 
the more positive longer term implications of the leveraged transactions beyond media 
portrayals and strict economistic studies of value creation. 
 
In particular, the failed leveraged transactions and the retailers’ subsequent entry into Chapter 
11 bankruptcy reorganisation ultimately laid the foundations for the department store 
industry’s re-emergence in the 1990s with an aligned structure and strategy.  This underlines 
the view of Kalay et al. (2007) that Chapter 11 provides net benefits to firms.  The role of 
                                                                                                                                             
2
 Abraham and Strauss, Rike Kumler, Shillitos, Lazurus and Rich’s were separate divisions of the 
Allied/Federated conglomerate at the time. 
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leadership proved critical here too.  The post-bankruptcy appointment of a new CEO, Allen 
Questrom, who had previously left the company to take up as CEO of Neiman Marcus, was 
crucial as ‘the continued involvement of original management in the restructuring process is 
strongly associated with poor postbankruptcy performance’ (Hotchkiss, 1995, p 4).  More 
significantly, Questrom was proactive in implementing a revised strategy that fed directly into 
structural change - placing an emphasis away from promotion towards divisional 
consolidation, eliminating poorly performing stores, remodelling rather than opening new 
stores and centralised shared back office systems.  Indeed, we should adopt a more 
entrepreneurial view of the recovery of the US department store sector where leadership was 
instrumental (cf. Wright et al., 2001).  The nature of Chapter 11 thus allowed Federated to turn 
around quickly and refloat.  The revitalised retailer acquired Macy’s in 1994, as it itself 
languished in Chapter 11 restructuring and the financially struggling Broadway Stores 
(formally Carter Hawley Hale) in 1995.  Most recently, during 2005, the strategy of portfolio 
restructuring recommenced with the merger of the two leading department store companies, 
Federated and May Department Stores, which saw further organisational reorganisation and 
structural change in search of greater operational efficiencies (Wood and Wrigley, 2007).  The 
turbulence of the LBO wave thus ultimately led to a more efficient and centralised department 
store sector, better prepared to face the competitive threats of the 1990s. 
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FIGURES/TABLES 
 
 
Table 1 Department Store Bankruptcies Following the Financial Restructuring Period 
 
Date of Chapter 11 Filing Retailer 
January 1990 Allied/Federated Department Stores 
April 1990 Ames Department Store 
February 1991 Carter Hawley Hale 
January 1992 R H Macy  
June 1994 Woodward & Lothrop Department Stores 
                                                                                  Source: author’s own database 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions and leveraged buy-outs, 
1981-1996
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Source: data manipulated from Baker and Smith (1998)  
 
 
  
Table 2 Diversification of Major US Department Store Companies 
 
Dept. Store 
Corporation 
Non-
department 
store sales 
1983 (%) 
Major entry into: 
Discount retailing Speciality retailing 
Years Example fascias Years Example fascias 
Allied 15 1961-1978 N/D 1979-early 1990s Bonwit Teller 
Brooks Brothers. 
Associated 35 1972-1976 Caldor 
Loehmann’s 
1916- acquired 
1986 
N/D 
Macy’s 0 1987- 1994 
(acquired) 
N/D 1970s/80s-1994 
(acquired) 
I Magnin 
Aeropostale 
Charter Club 
Federated 28 1968-early 
1990s 
Gold Triangle 
(home furnishings) 
Gold Circle 
(off-price apparel) 
Main Street 
1982-early 1990s Children’s Place 
May’s 29 1970-early 
1990s 
Volume Shoe 1979-early 1990s Venture  
(shoe chain) 
Dayton Hudson  
(now Target 
Corp.) 
79 1962-present Target 
Mervyn’s 
1966-N/D N/D 
Carter Hawley 
Hale 
30 None - 1969-acquired 1987 Contempo Casuals 
Holt Renfrew & Co. 
(Canada) 
Sunset House  
(mail order) 
N/D – No data   
Source: adapted, with modifications from Laulajainen, 1987, p 235.  Additional data from various historic 
company reports 
 
 Table 3 Major Conventional Department Store Rationalisation, 1985-1995 
 
 Fiscal 1985  
Company No. of Divisions Sales ($ millions) Per Avg. Division/ $ 
millions 
Federated Dept. Stores 11 6,685 608 
RH Macy 4 4,368 1,092 
Carter Hawley Hale 6 3,979 663 
Allied Stores 17 3,349 197 
May Dept. Stores 10 3,327 333 
Associated Dry Goods 10 2,724 272 
Batus 5 2,300 460 
Mercantile Stores 13 1,880 145 
Dillard Dept. Stores 5 1,601 320 
Dayton Hudson 2 1,448 724 
Subtotal 83 31,661 381 
Nordstrom 1 1,302 1,302 
Total 84 32,963 392 
    
 Fiscal 1995  
Company No. of Divisions Sales ($ millions) Per Avg. Division/ $ 
millions 
Federated Dept. Stores 7 14,820 (a) 2,117 
May Dept. Stores 8 10,612 1,327 
Dillard Dept. Stores 5 5,918 1,184 
Dayton Hudson 1 3,193 3,193 
Mercantile Stores 5 2,892 578 
Subtotal 26 37,435 1,440 
Nordstrom 1 4,114 4,114 
Neiman Marcus 2 1,888 944 
Saks Fifth Avenue (b) 1 1,496 1,496 
Total 30 44,932 1,498 
(a) Includes results from acquired Broadway units; excludes Macy’s Speciality and Close-Out operations 
(b) Full-Line and Resort stores only; excludes Off 5th operations 
NB  Nordstrom, Neiman Marcus, Saks Fifth Avenue are categorised as speciality department stores and thus not 
included in the conventional department store industry.   
 
Source: Goldman Sachs (1996) Department Stores: Rediscovering the Reinvented, Goldman Sachs Investment Research, 
New York, May 3, 1996, p 30. 
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Table 4  Federated Divisional Consolidations, 1982-1996 
 
Year Divisions  New Division Name Comments 
1982 Rike’s (Dayton)    
 
  Shillito Rike’s (Cincinnati)  
 
Shillito’s (Cincinnati)    
 
    
1986 Shillito Rike’s 
(Cincinnati) 
   
 
  Lazarus (Cincinnati)  
 
Lazarus (Columbus)    
 
    
1987 Block (Indianapolis)   Block acquired from Allied Stores 
 
  Lazarus  
 
Lazarus    
 
    
1988  
Goldsmith’s 
  Memphis area retains Goldsmith’s 
nameplate 
 
  Rich’s  
 
Rich’s    
 
    
1992 Abraham and Strauss    
 
  Abraham and Strauss/Jordan Marsh  
 
Jordan Marsh    
 
    
1994 Joseph Horne Co.   Acquisition 
 
  Lazarus  
 
Lazarus    
 
    
1994 Macy’s East   Acquisition 
 
  Macy’s East  
 
Abraham and 
Strauss/Jordan Marsh 
   
 
    
1995 Rich/Goldsmith’s    
 
  Rich’s/Lazarus/Goldsmith’s (Atlanta)  
 
Lazarus    
 
    
1995 Broadway (Broadway, 
Emporium and 
Weinstocks 
nameplates) 
 5 stores: Bloomingdale’s 
56 stores: Macy 
21 stores sold 
Acquisition of 82 stores 
 
    
1996 Jordan Marsh  Macy East Loses autonomy in Macy East 
Division 
 
    
1996 Bullock’s  Macy West Loses autonomy in Macy West 
Division 
 
 
Source: Various trade press literature and discussions with company executives 
 
 
 
 
 22  
Acknowledgements 
I gratefully acknowledge the beneficial and constructive comments of two anonymous referees and the 
participation of the many US retail executives who contributed their time to this project.  All errors and 
omissions remain my own. 
 
References 
 
Acar, W., Keating, R., Aupperle, K., Hall, W. and Engdahl, R. (2003) ‘Peering at the past century's corporate 
strategy through the looking glass of time-series analysis: extrapolating from Chandler's classic mid-century 
American firms?’ Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 40, No. 5, pp. 1225-1254. 
 
Anson, M. (2002) ‘A primer on distressed debt investing’, Journal of Private Equity, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 6-17. 
 
Baker, G., Jensen, M. and Murphy, K. (1998) ‘Compensation and incentives: practice vs. theory’, Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 63, No. 3, pp. 593-616. 
 
Baker, G. and Smith, G. (1998) The New Financial Capitalists, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Bradley, M. and Rosenzweig, M. (1992) ‘The untenable case for Chapter 11’, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 101, No. 
5, pp. 1043-1095. 
 
Braun, M. and Latham, S. (2007) ‘The governance of going private transactions. The leveraged buyout board of 
directors as a distinctive source of value’, Management Decision, Vol. 45, No. 5, pp. 866-882. 
 
Brockmann, E., Hoffman, J. and Dawley, D. (2006) ‘A contingency theory of CEO successor choice and post-
bankruptcy strategic choice’, Journal of Management Issues, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 213-231. 
 
Bruining, H., Bonnet, M. and Wright, M. (2004) ‘Management control systems and strategy change in buyouts’, 
Management Accounting Research, Vol. 15, pp. 155-177. 
 
Bruton, G., Keels, J. and Scifres, E. (2002) ‘Corporate restructuring and performance: an agency perspective on 
the complete buyout cycle’, Journal of Business Research, Vol. 55, No. 9, pp. 709-724. 
 
Business Week (1990) ‘The best and worst deals of the ‘80s’, Business Week, 15 January, p 52. 
 
Chandler, A. (1966)  Strategy and Structure, Doubleday, New York, NY. 
 
Chandler, A. (1977) The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business, Harvard University 
Press, Harvard, MA. 
 
Clark, F. E., Onthank, H., Dodd, A. E., Nystrom, P. H., Griffen, C. E., Lyon, L. S., McGarry, E. D. (1926) 
‘Reducing the costs of marketing’.  Papers and Proceedings of the Thirty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the 
American Economic Association, The American Economic Review, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 250-265. 
 
Cotter, J. and Peck, S. (2001) ‘The structure of debt and active equity investors: the case of the buyout 
specialist’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 59, No. 1, pp. 101-147. 
 
Dawley, D., Hoffman, J. and Brockman, E. (2003) ‘Do size and diversification type matter? An examination of 
post-bankruptcy outcomes’, Journal of Managerial Issues, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp 413-429. 
 
Dawson, J. (2000) ‘Retailing at century end: some challenges for management and research’, International 
Review of Retail, Distribution and Consumer Research, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 119-148. 
 
Denis, D. (1994) ‘Organizational form and the consequences of highly leveraged transactions: Kroger’s 
recapitalization and Safeway’s LBO’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 193-224. 
 
Forsyth, J. N. (1993) ‘Department store restructure for the 1990s’, Chain Store Age, 1 August, p 29A. 
 
 23  
Frick, F. (2001) ‘Distressed spreads for non-distressed bonds: Overcoming the stigma of “junk bonds”’, Journal 
of Asset Management, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 267-278. 
 
Gary, M. (2005) ‘Implementation strategy and performance outcomes in related diversification’, Strategic 
Management Journal, Vol. 26, No. 7, pp. 643-664. 
 
Goold, M. and Luchs, K. (1993) ‘Why diversify? Four decades of management thinking’, Academy of 
Management Executive, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 7-25. 
 
Griffen, C., Copeland, M., Clark, F., Filene, E., Beckman, T., Tosdal, H. and Schmalz, C. (1928) ‘Marketing’, 
Papers and Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, March 1928, 
The American Economic Review, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 17-28. 
 
Hallsworth, A. (1991) ‘The Campeau takeovers: the arbitrage economy in action’, Environment and Planning A, 
Vol. 23, pp. 1217-1223. 
 
Holmstrom, B. and Kaplan, S. (2001) ‘Corporate governance and merger activity in the United States: making 
sense of the 1980s and 1990s’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 121-144. 
 
Hotchkiss, E. (1995) ‘Postbankruptcy performance and management turnover’, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 50, 
No. 1, pp., 3-21. 
 
Jensen, M. (1989) ‘Active investors, LBOs and the privatisation of bankruptcy’, Journal of Applied Corporate 
Finance, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 35-44. 
 
Jensen, M. (1993) ‘The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems’, Journal 
of Finance, Vol. 48, No. 3, pp. 831-880. 
 
Jensen, M. (2005) ‘Agency costs of overvalued equity’, Financial Management, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 5-19. 
 
Jensen, M., Kaplan, S., Ferenbach, C., Feldberg, M., Moon, J. and Davis, C. (2006) Morgan Stanley roundtable 
on private equity and its import for public companies’, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 18, No.3, 
pp. 8-37. 
 
Jensen, M. and Meckling, W. (1976) ‘Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership 
structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 305-360. 
 
Kalay, A., Singhal, R., Tashjian, E. (2007) ‘Is Chapter 11 costly?’  Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 84, 
No. 3, pp 772-796. 
 
Kaplan, S. (1989) ‘Campeau’s acquisition of Federated: value destroyed or value added, Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 25, pp. 191-212. 
 
Kaplan, S. (1994) ‘Campeau’s acquisitions of Federated: post-bankruptcy results’, Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 35, No. 5, pp. 123-136. 
 
Lamond, D. (2006) ‘Management and its history: the worthy endeavour of the scribe’, Journal of Management 
History, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 5-11. 
 
Laulajainen, R. (1987) Spatial Strategies in Retailing, D Reidel Publishing , Dordrecht. 
 
Laulajainen R (1988) ‘The spatial dimension of an acquisition’ Economic Geography, Vol. 64, pp. 171-187. 
 
Laulajainen, R. (1990) ‘Defense by expansion’, Professional Geographer, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp.277-288. 
 
Loomis, C. (1990) ‘The biggest looniest deal ever’, Fortune, June 18. 
 
 24  
McDowell, E. (2004) The ‘Creditory’ Instinct: Using Chapter-11 to Hijack Ownership of Corporate Assets 
from Shareholders, Paper presented at the Business: Back to Basics, Society for Advanced Management 
Conference, 18th – 21st March 2004. 
 
McNair, M. (1950) ‘Thinking ahead’, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 18-144. 
 
McNair, M. and May, E. (1978) ‘The next revolution of the retailing wheel’, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 56, 
No. 5, pp. 81-91. 
 
Meyer, K. and Lieb-Dóczy, E. (2003) ‘Post-acquisition restructuring as evolutionary process, Journal of 
Management Studies, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 459-482. 
 
Nikoskelainen, E. and Wright, M. (2007) ‘The impact of corporate governance mechanisms on value increase in 
leveraged buyouts’, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 511-537. 
 
Peck, S. (2004) ‘The carrot versus the stick: the role of incentive compensation and debt obligations in the 
success of LBOs’, American Business Review, Vol. 22, pp. 1-12. 
 
Porter, M. (1985) Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance, The Free Press, New 
York, NY. 
 
Raff, D. (1991) ‘Robert Campeau and Innovation in the Internal and Industrial Organization of Department 
Store Retailing: Are the ‘80s and ‘90s the ‘20s and ‘30s All Over Again (and Why Does it Matter)?’, Paper 
presented at the 37th Annual Meeting of the Business Historical Conference, Toronto, March, 1991, Business 
and Economic History, Second Series, Vol. 20, pp. 52-61. 
 
Rodrigues, J. (2002) ‘Strategy and structure redux’, Business Strategy Review, Vol. 13, No. 3, No. 20-27. 
 
Rothchild J, (1991) Going for Broke: How Robert Campeau Bankrupted the Retail Industry, Jolted the Junk 
Bond Market and Bought the Booming ‘80s to a Crashing Halt, Beard Books, Washington DC. 
 
Savitt, R. (1989) ‘Looking back to see ahead: writing the history of American retailing’ Journal of Retailing, 
Vol. 65, No. 3, pp. 326-355. 
 
Schoenberger, E. (1997) The Cultural Crisis of the Firm, Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 
 
Servaes, H. (1994) ‘Do takeover targets overinvest’, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 253-278. 
 
Serwer, A. (1996) ‘The man who rained on Macy’s parade’, Fortune, December 9. 
 
Sharma, V. (2004) ‘Why an LBO must begin with a partnership’, Investment Banking, May, pp. 39-42.  
 
Simpson, J. (2001) ‘Did May Company’s acquisition of Associated Dry Goods reduce competition? An event 
study analysis’, Review of Industrial Organization, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 351-362. 
 
Tedlow, R. (1996) New and Improved. The Story of Mass Marketing in America, Harvard Business School 
Press, Boston, MA. 
 
Thompson, S. and Wright, M. (1995) ‘Corporate governance: the role of restructuring transactions’, The 
Economic Journal, Vol. 105, No. 430, pp. 690-703. 
 
Toms, S. and Wright, M. (2005) ‘Divergence and convergence within Anglo-American corporate governance: 
evidence from the US and UK, 1950-2000’, Business History, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 267-295. 
 
Trachtenberg, J. (1996) The Rain on Macy’s Parade, Times Books, New York. 
 
Traub, M. (1994) Like No Other Store…The Bloomingdale’s Legend and the Revolution in American Marketing, 
Times Books, New York  
 25  
 
Walters, D. (1994) ‘The impact of the recession on retailing management decisions and performance’, 
International Journal of Retail and Distribution Management, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 20-31. 
 
Wood, S (2002) ‘Organisational restructuring, knowledge and spatial scale: the case of the US department store 
industry’, Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geographie, Vol. 93, No. 1, pp. 8-33. 
 
Wood, S. and Wrigley, N. (2007) ‘Market power and regulation - the last great US department store 
consolidation’, International Journal of Retail and Distribution Management. Vol.35, No.1, pp. 20-37 
 
Wright, M., Hoskisson, R. and Busenitz, L. (2001) ‘Firm rebirth: buyouts as facilitators of strategic growth and 
entrepreneurship’, Academy of Management Executive, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 111-125. 
 
Wright, M., Thompson, S. and Burrows, A. (2005) ‘Corporate governance: the role of venture capitalists and 
buy-outs’.  In K. Keasey, S. Thompson and M. Wright (eds.) (2005) Corporate Governance: Accountability, 
Enterprise and International Comparisons, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, pp 207-233. 
 
